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Abstract: Many theories of global distributive justice are based on the assumption that 
all humans hold common ownership of the earth. As the earth is finite and our actions 
interconnect, we need a system of justice that regulates the potential appropriation 
of the common earth to ensure fairness. According to these theories, imposing limits 
and distributive obligations on private and public property arrangements may be 
the best mechanism for governing common ownership. We present a critique of the 
assumption that this issue can be solved within the private–public property regime, 
arguing that the boundaries of this regime should not be taken for granted and that 
the growing literature on the democratic commons movement suggests how this can 
be accomplished. We consider that, if the earth is defined as a common, the private–
public property paradigm must be open to questioning, and democratic commoners’ 
activities should be considered.
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Introduction
Concerns over the privatisation of natural resources, a renewed attention 
towards both global and local forms of inequality and a growing worry over 
an ecological crisis have reintroduced the idea of the earth as a common. In 
philosophical literature, numerous suggestions have come to the surface; here, 
we focus on two approaches to the common ownership of the earth. On the 
one hand, we look at common ownership theories within the global distributive 
justice literature (hereafter, GDJ) and, on the other, we examine democratic 
theories of the commons, which allow us to expose an unquestioned assumption 
in many GDJ theories: that private and public property institutions (filtered 
through global distributive principles) are consistent with the universalist 
aspirations central to the idea of the common ownership of the earth. We argue 
that GDJ theories’ dependence on private and public property arrangements 
have deficiencies that demand a radical democratic turn. 
Although we are aware of the variety within GDJ literature, and of the large 
scope of issues that this tradition addresses,1 we focus our efforts on GDJ 
accounts that acknowledge some kind of common ownership of the earth and 
1   Our research is confined to the ownership of the earth as a physical space. For a thorough review of the literature, 
approaches and issues of GDJ, see Chris Armstrong, Global Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012).
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examine their shared assumptions regarding how private–public property 
arrangements can overcome global collective action problems. These theories 
share the belief that some kind of commonality exists in our ownership of 
the earth. We consider how common ownership is justified in this literature, 
what principles follow from this justification and how it arrives at some kind 
of private/public property arrangement to solve the problems arising from 
common ownership. 
Section II introduces the common ownership of the earth in GDJ. It looks at the 
justification for common ownership, what problems arise from conceiving the 
earth as a common and the implications for potential governance mechanisms. 
GDJ proposes to govern common ownership by adjusting private and public 
property regimes and ensure a fairer distribution of the earth’s benefits and 
burdens. Section III presents our critique of the GDJ’s dependence on private 
and public property. First, we uncover a shared characteristic of private and 
public institutions of property: their monological nature. Then, we show that this 
particular feature leads to a series of democratic deficits. By radical democratic 
standards, monological property institutions fail to foster democratic conflict 
and participation and cannot fully counter domination. This implies that GDJ 
theories fall short of their own universalistic aspirations by exclusively relying 
on monological property arrangements. Finally, we show that the democratic 
commons movement could play a vital role in confronting monological property 
arrangements and thus help remedy some of the normative difficulties that 
emerge from these arrangements. 
Common Ownership in GDJ
Justification
The justification for the common ownership of the earth in GDJ stems from 
three broad assumptions regarding the human condition and its relation to our 
planet: (1) the space and goods of the earth are necessary for human survival; 
(2) this survival is morally relevant; and (3) as the earth exists without human 
interference, no human has any prior claim to any of its spaces or resources.2 This 
puts humans in a special relation with their environment: although everyone has 
a natural claim to subsist, no one has a prior claim over the resources required 
for this subsistence. We call this the common ownership condition. Throughout 
this paper, we consider this condition to be an unavoidable fact of the human 
relation to the earth.
The common ownership condition imposes restrictions on the earth’s 
2   Mathias Risse, On Global Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 113-114. For Risse’s full 
account of common ownership, see Chs. 5-10.
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potential use and occupation. We all have an equal moral entitlement to the 
earth, and, in case of rivalry in its consumption and occupation, it is necessary 
to have an authority that defines the rules and boundaries of the occupation and 
the use of the commons. This implies that all humans stand on equal grounds 
in relation to the earth and its benefits.3 Humans are inevitably entrapped on 
a finite and rivalrous planet on which everyone depends for subsistence. As 
interaction and contact among humans is unavoidable, and because the earth’s 
occupation and use are inevitably rivalrous, we have a duty to establish a system 
of justice that ensures both compliance with common ownership conditions and 
the protection of everyone’s entitlement to survive.4
Mathias Risse offers the most thorough justification for egalitarianism in 
common ownership. According to him, all humanity stands on an equal political 
status regarding common land and resources, thus leading to two principles:
First, each person, independent of her actions, has a natural right 
to use original resources and spaces to satisfy her basic needs, and 
second, in conflicts with any further entitlements with respect to 
these resources, this natural right has priority.5 
With his account of natural rights, Risse intends to ensure that each individual 
has the opportunity to access the goods and spaces required for human 
subsistence. This account defends each individual’s equal status with regard to 
the common earth and protects the equal opportunity required to access what 
each needs to survive. According to Risse, each individual either has a direct 
right to use and occupy the commons required for subsistence or to live under 
alternative property regimes that ensure that everyone has the opportunity to 
satisfy basic needs.6 
The inevitable rivalry of our planet and everyone’s entitlement to satisfy their 
basic needs will lead to an unsustainable ecological crisis if a system of rules 
and boundaries that can regulate individual entitlements over the common is 
not established. Thomas Hobbes noted this centuries ago in his depiction of the 
state of war we would live in if we did not have rules over the un-owned earth. 
This concern is still alive in present theories: neither the philosophical and social 
nor the scientific literatures consider that an open-access regime for common 
3   Two different roads lead to this conclusion: the idea of natural rights, stemming from the Lockean/Grotian traditions 
which ground both libertarian and non-relational liberal egalitarian theories and the Kantian /Humean traditions 
that justify equality through interaction.
4  Armstrong (2012), pp. 25-30.
5  Risse (2012), Ch. 6, p. 115.
6  Risse (2012), pp. 110-115.
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goods would be sustainable without proper regulations and governance.7 Thus, 
GDJ theories argue that boundaries between one individual’s natural right of 
subsistence, the external non-appropriated world, and another individual’s 
same right must be established. An inevitable need exists for some type of 
property arrangement that fixes the boundaries between each individual’s 
entitlement to use and occupy the commons. Any arrangement must serve 
‘the society’s socioeconomic purposes in a reasonable way while remaining 
consistent with original ownership rights.’8 Thus, commonality and subsistence 
can find balance in a condition of rivalry and interconnectedness through the 
institution of property.9
Appropriation and Distribution
To ensure that rivalry does not conflict with the sustainability of the commons 
and that the equal entitlement of all humans to the common earth is respected, 
a property arrangement that balances rivalry and equality is needed. However, 
nothing has been stated about the type of property required to deal with this 
issue. Apart from the open-access regime, which we argued above, cannot sustain 
the original commons, three alternative property arrangements are considered: 
private, public and common ownership. GDJ theories have considered both 
private and public forms of property as ways to ‘solve’ the common ownership 
condition. We briefly note some instances where GDJ concedes to common 
property arrangement within the proposals, and a detailed analysis of this 
alternative is considered in the final section.
Among the GDJ theorists, the most relevant justifications for private 
appropriation of the common earth come from the (left-) libertarian tradition.10 
As a matter of definition, left-libertarians agree to some kind of egalitarian 
ownership of the earth and its resources which stems from everyone’s equal no-
prior-entitlement to the external world.11 Left-libertarians intend to justify each 
individual’s use and occupation of the common while respecting every other 
individual’s equal (non-)entitlement. They argue that private appropriation 
of the common is an inevitable consequence of each individual’s labour and 
right of self-ownership: an individual’s work on the common implies an 
appropriation of the common, thus turning it into private property.12 However, 
7   Risse (2012), pp. 115-119; Michael Otsuka, ‘Self-Ownership and Equality: A Lockean Reconciliation’, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 27 (1998), 65-92. In social scientific literature, Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Unmanaged 
Commons’, Trends in Ecology & Evolution 9/5 (1994), 199; Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The evolution 
of institutions for collective action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Ch. 3.
8  Risse (2012), p. 104.
9  Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
10  Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner (eds.), Left-Libertarianism and its Critics (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2000).
11  Peter Vallentyne, ‘Introduction: Left-Libertarianism — a Primer’ in Vallentyne and Steiner (Eds.) (2000), 1-20.
12  Vallentyne (2000), p. 10.
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because of everyone’s equal entitlement to the common earth, this act of 
appropriation cannot be left unrestrained; a set of rules and constraints on 
private appropriation must ensure that no one encroaches on another’s equal 
entitlement to the common. 
This is known as the Lockean proviso: appropriation is justified as long as 
enough is left for everyone else to acquire an equally advantageous share of the 
common.13 The proviso ensures everyone’s equal entitlement to appropriate by 
limiting each individual’s appropriation. Although private property is justified 
due to everyone’s right to themselves and their labour, this right to appropriate 
is neither permanent nor absolute; it depends on the availability of a resource 
and the assurance that all those excluded from a privately appropriated good 
or space have access to an equally advantageous share or are compensated 
for their exclusion.14 The most feasible way of ensuring every individual’s use 
and occupation of the common earth is by limiting each individual’s use and 
occupation of it. The central role turns from the private owner to the authority 
capable of binding and regulating potential appropriation, thus protecting 
everyone’s equal entitlement.15 The collective control over property rights is 
defined by justifying every individual’s right to the common earth as being 
superior to each individual’s equal entitlement. 
The latter statement paves the way for public property arrangements as a 
solution to the common ownership condition. Although public property is 
generally linked to state ownership, GDJ works are inclined to expand it so that 
it refers to centrally controlled properties whose benefits are distributed to a 
community through unilateral actions. For GDJ, public forms of property may 
be fundamental to ensure the protection of both equality and commonality. 
If individuals are all equally entitled to have access to the goods required for 
subsistence, then the protection and provision of these goods by a central 
authority may be a way to meet everyone’s entitlements.16 By limiting private 
appropriation through the establishment of a public ownership regime 
over fundamental resources and territories, an authority can ensure that all 
individuals have access to all common goods through the centralised provision 
and distribution of public goods.17
GDJ theorists defend the Lockean proviso and public forms of property as 
means to tackle global issues. For example, in contemporary left-libertarian 
theories, the Lockean proviso encompasses the whole earth as a common 
13  For the various contemporary libertarian versions of the Lockean proviso see Vallentyne and Steiner (2000), Part I.
14  Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism without Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 11-40.
15  Waldron (1988).
16  Thomas Pogge, ‘Allowing the Poor to Share the World’, Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2011), 335-352.
17  Risse (2012), pp. 25-28. 
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and considers all humans as being equally entitled to it and its benefits.18 
Cosmopolitan theories of liberal inclination use the same line of reasoning to 
criticise states’ absolute authority over their territories: for the Lockean proviso 
to be just, it must apply on a global scale rather than on the morally arbitrary 
boundaries of states.19 Thus, just as individuals must leave a fair share of the 
land or resources they appropriate, states must do the same on a global scale.20 
Domestic forms of public property should be bound by the restrictions of the 
Lockean proviso, and the benefits obtained from the common earth should be 
redistributed across borders. Thus, any regulative system that intends to ensure 
a just distribution of the common earth’s benefits ought to be established on a 
global scale, considering all humans as equal, rather than relying on an idealised 
vision of self-sufficient domestic societies.21 According to GDJ theories, it is 
a morally arbitrary fact that some people are born in fertile lands and have 
easy access to everything required for subsistence while others find themselves 
(through no fault of their own) dwelling in wastelands where nothing grows in 
the soil and where access to clean water is difficult or impossible. Thus, justice 
demands a fair distribution of the benefits obtained from these unequally 
allocated resources to all humans. 22
The natural facts of our existence on the earth cannot be avoided; there 
is no justice or injustice inherent to our biological needs nor to the natural 
characteristics of the planet we live on; the common ownership condition and the 
arbitrary configuration of resources across the planet are natural characteristics 
that are outside the realm of justice. According to GDJ theorists, justice or 
injustice lie in how we deal with this natural condition in our socio-political 
constructions. The issue arises from our present property regimes which enable 
exclusions that are even more arbitrary than the natural ones, thus allowing a 
part of humanity to claim (as private or public property) most of the advantages 
from the common earth and its resources while excluding others from most of 
its benefits.23 In private and public property regimes, the right to exclude (be it 
by individuals or collectives) is a socially constructed institution that, at least in 
its current state, does not accord with the common ownership condition and the 
equal moral relevance of all humans.
Through their critique of current property arrangements, GDJ theories 
propose an alternative allocation of the benefits taken from the common earth. 
18   Vallentyne (2000), pp. 11-12; Hillel Steiner, ‘Just Taxation and International Redistribution’, in Ian Shapiro and Lea 
Brilmayer (eds.), Nomos XLI: Global Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
19   Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 161-
166; Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders. A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), Ch. 
5; Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), Ch. 5. 
20  Pogge (2008), Ch. 8; Peter Singer (2002) One World (New Haven: Yale University Press), Ch. 2.
21  Beitz (1999), pp. 129-135; Caney (2005), pp. 25-62; Pogge (2008), Ch. 4. 
22  Beitz, (1999), pp. 136-142; Steiner (1999); Pogge (2008), Ch. 8. 
23  Pogge (2008).
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Thus, their intention is not necessarily to question the foundations of private/
public property arrangements; rather, they propose to adjust these arrangements 
such that their benefits are less unequally distributed. In short, GDJ theories 
consider that all humans’ equal right to the common earth can be ensured by 
including fair and egalitarian (re)distributive mechanisms within private and 
public forms of property. The idea of common property, as a system of collective 
ownership where a community jointly decides and controls the use and access 
(and potential distribution) of a common, does not have much relevance in 
GDJ literature.24 Common property, following the above definition, is defended 
in GDJ for more or less the same spaces as in contemporary conventions of 
international law (such as the atmosphere, outer space, the deep seabed or 
Antarctica).25 The remaining natural resources and spaces of the earth are left to 
private and public property arrangements with compensatory or redistributive 
mechanisms.26 
This leaves GDJ looking for amendments within private and public ownership 
arrangements that coincide with the common ownership condition. The 
discussion over property regimes is left aside, and the focus shifts to the just 
distribution of ‘the benefits and burdens’ of our common planet and its goods.27 
What matters is that each individual is ensured a fair share of the benefits from 
the global commons. The problems that arise from the common ownership 
condition do not lie within the private–public property regime but rather in 
the unfair distribution of the benefits from this regime. Thus, it is not that 
individuals or collectives should not be allowed to appropriate the commons 
but that they should not be allowed to hoard all the benefits from such an 
appropriation. Private ownership coincides with original common ownership 
through the inclusion of a Lockean proviso that limits private appropriation 
and redistributes the benefits to those excluded. Public ownership, in its statist 
forms, is questioned and amended to ensure that state boundaries do not restrict 
access to the benefits obtained from the global commons. However, this does not 
lead to an abolition of public property; rather, it entails an expansion of the scope 
of individuals who should benefit from a single public property arrangement. 
As many goods and spaces of the earth are common to all humanity, global (or 
international) institutions should have authority over the just distribution of 
the benefits obtained from these global goods.
24  See pp. 150-151 in this article for Risse’s critique of ‘joint ownership’ and our response. 
25   Risse (2012), Ch. 10; Singer (2002), Ch. 2; Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), Ch. 4. 
26   Although many theories defend common ownership of the earth, their proposals perpetuate private (and public) 
appropriation, provided that occupation and/or use of commons are taxed and the benefits are redistributed to all 
those who are excluded. See footnote 22.
27  Armstrong (2012), p. 15, also pp. 11-17; Caney (2005), pp. 102-104.
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A Critique on the Appropriation of Commons
Even though the GDJ approach to the common ownership condition offers 
strong normative justifications for transforming our conception of global 
interactions and formulates a system of global governance that could be 
considered fairer than our current order, this literature does not fully engage 
with one pressing issue: the private–public property paradigm. Although GDJ 
authors stand on a common ownership framework to justify their proposals, 
and despite their intent to construct a more egalitarian global society through 
a critique of unjust appropriation, they only consider alternatives within the 
private–public property regime while overlooking alternatives to it. Thus, we 
consider the GDJ critique of property to be incomplete: they criticise unjust 
private appropriation while intending to transform the arbitrary statist–public 
property regime, but they are indifferent to looking at alternatives to these 
arrangements. With our critique, we question this dependence on private 
and public property arrangements. First, we clarify some of the assumptions 
of this property paradigm, and, on uncovering the logic of private and public 
ownership, we show why this classical paradigm might be problematic from a 
normative standpoint.
Private and Public Property Institutions as Monological
What is property? Although both legal theorists and philosophers have tried to 
answer this question, no uncontested definition has ever been proposed.28 For 
the sake of our argument, we will have to consider a single conception, the one 
central to GDJ theories regarding the common ownership of the earth. This is 
the sovereign conception of property.29 
William Blackstone’s old description could be seen as one of the first attempts 
at definition: (private) property, he writes, is the ‘sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.’30 This accords 
with people’s common-sense ideas about property: it is a relation between 
an individual and an object; the right to property enables this individual to 
do whatever he/she pleases with this object (within the confines of law); and 
owners can exclude others from either using, managing or alienating this object. 
Though intuitively reasonable, neither is this definition without its limitations 
nor is it uncritically accepted by the GDJ. Property rights, for instance, are 
not natural but exist by the grace of law; to fulfil their function, they have to 
be publicly acknowledged through the institution of law, thus implying that 
28  Margaret Davies, Property: Meanings, Histories, Theories (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 20.
29  Mikhaïl Xifaras, La Propriété: Étude de Philosophie du Droit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004), p. 487.
30  Quoted in Davies (2007), p. 1.
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property is a relation between individuals (ultimately enforced by the state or 
another public authority) and with respect to an object.31 Furthermore, it fails to 
capture what is essential about the sovereign character of property: the right to 
arbitrarily exclude might be the default mode of private forms of property, but it 
is certainly not central to public forms of property. To exclude someone from a 
public good, a public institution has to provide acceptable reasons.32 Moreover, 
the GDJ themselves would probably not accept this definition of property since 
they are concerned with making the institutions of property more inclusive.
However, there is one underlying characteristic that is present in both private 
and public forms of property. Ownership, Larissa Katz contends, does not 
principally imply that the owner can exclude someone from his/her property, 
but that he/she is the exclusive agenda setter with regard to this property. For 
example, an individual can enter a piece of land that I own without infringing 
on my property rights if he/she abides by the rules that I set regarding this land. 
Thus, a structure of power characterises a property: the owner is on top of a 
hierarchy, and he/she decides who can do what with the property. This does not 
necessarily imply that others cannot use the space or cross the boundaries that 
delineate it. They can do this as long as they stay well within the limits of the 
agenda set by the owner.33 To be clear, this can still lead to forms of exclusion: 
if I own a piece of land with an apple tree on it, and I allow third parties to enter 
my piece of land but forbid them to eat the apples, I do exclude them — just not 
in a narrow spatial sense. I might even allow them to eat the apples without 
allowing them to determine how the apples will be distributed; again, this is a 
form of exclusion — in this case, exclusion from the decision-making process. 
Now it should be clear how this applies to private forms of property, but how 
exactly does it apply to public forms of property? First of all, it is not rare for 
property theorists to draw analogies between property and sovereignty. Both rely 
on a notion of hierarchy that has a single agenda setter at the top.34 However, 
the important follow-up question is whether a public owner could be seen as an 
exclusive agenda setter and whether this status is comparable to that of a private 
owner. Does the public not share the function of agenda setting? We would like 
to argue that this is not necessarily the case. Consider, for instance, the subject 
of water management. As Anna Di Robilant argues, as far as water is concerned, 
31   Ann E. Davis, The Evolution of the Property Relation: Understanding Paradigms, Debates, and Prospects (London: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), pp. 28-29; Davies (2007), p. 11.
32   Benjamin Porat, ‘Ownership and Exclusivity: Two Visions, Two Traditions’, American Journal of Comparative Law 
(Published Online in Advance).
33  Larissa Katz, ‘Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law’, University of Toronto Law Journal 58/3 (2008), 275-315.
34   Katz (2008), pp. 293-295. This is not to suggest that property is a form of sovereignty. Property depends on sovereignty 
as the tracing of territorial borders constitutive of sovereignty forms a precondition for the establishment of both 
private and public property. See, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, Border as Method, Or the Multiplication of 
Labor (London: Duke University Press, 2013), p. 292. 
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there seems to be little difference between public and private ownership in 
some respects. While a public owner cannot sell, he/she does have the sole 
power to make decisions on the use of the resource (guided and constrained 
by the ‘public interest’). This has the concrete consequence that the public has 
use entitlements but no management entitlements.35 Citizens are, in other 
words, treated as consumers and not as socially autonomous individuals who 
co-determine the rules governing the common. This leads us to conclude that, 
while the public is in principle an (indirect) agenda setter with regard to public 
forms of property, this is rarely the de facto case. As John Medearis reminds 
us, ‘[p]olitical analysis that is informed by a longer historical view shows that 
we should always regard the modern state as potentially or partly alienated,’ 
meaning that ‘[t]here are just too many ways for state powers to escape common 
control.’36 In other words, states (and by extension, most public institutions of 
a certain size and complexity) have a tendency to escape democratic control. 
Thus, we can conclude by saying that private and public forms of property can 
be regarded as monological forms of property: the function of agenda setting is 
exclusive and not shared by the general public. 
A Democratic Critique of Monological Property Regimes
So what is the problem with private and public forms of property? Most critical 
accounts of property focus on access, or rather lack of access; property becomes 
problematic when people lack access to resources that are necessary for their 
subsistence or to the goods that would allow them to develop their capacities.37 
These critiques are certainly vital. Nonetheless, we want to argue for more 
than access, as ‘access […] equally presupposes a kind of ‘meta-access’ to the 
laws.’38 In other words, institutions of property become problematic not only 
when people lack access to resources necessary for their subsistence but also 
when these people are not involved in the democratic co-determination of the 
use of these resources. It is precisely the GDJ’s narrow focus on access to the 
benefits of common resources that concerns us. Merely moving resources from 
the private to the public will not be sufficient; citizens’ direct involvement is 
essential to the defence of commons. 
To justify this assertion, we base our examination on radical theories of 
democracy. The different (oppositional, agonistic, participatory) theories that 
fall under this category are critical of representative democracy, the excessive 
35   Anna Di Robilant, ‘Property and Deliberation: A New Type of Ownership’ in Saki Bailey, Gilda Farrell and Ugo Mattei 
(eds.), Protecting Future Generations through Commons (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2013), 61-80, p. 
65.
36  John Meadearis, Why Democracy is Oppositional (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015), p. 171
37  See C.B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
38  Paul Blokker, ‘Commons, Constitutions and Critique’, Lo Squaderno. Explorations in Space and Society (2013), p. 45.
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focus on consensus in mainstream theories of democracy and the different 
forms of domination; furthermore, all such theories value popular participation, 
democratic conflict and non-domination.39 We will show why it is problematic 
that most private and public institutions of property fall short of these criteria.
Conflict: Decisions about resources are not taken based only on information 
but are also informed by values (efficiency, justice and sustainability).40 In a 
private or public property arrangement, only one exclusive agenda setter exists: 
the owner. Thus, it is either an individual or a public authority that sets the agenda. 
Therefore, the owner’s values prevail when it comes to decisions regarding his/
her property. This is no different in the alternative property regimes GDJ authors 
prescribe: only one set of values — more precisely, a particular conception of 
the principles that should ground the just (re)distribution of the benefits of a 
given space or resource — is instantiated in a particular property regime.
The first important question is whether these monological property regimes 
are appropriate in our post-traditional societies.41 Agonistic democrats deny this; 
in post-traditional societies, conflicts of values cannot be settled conclusively. 
Any attempt to settle this conflict of values in favour of one particular set of 
values, thus resulting in one particular property regime, will inevitably involve 
certain exclusions — some of which might be justified but others might not be.42 
The problem is that the difference between justified and unjustified exclusions 
is often invisible from within a particular normative order due to the fact that 
remainders and blind spots are bound to be generated in any attempt to define a 
universal normative order.43 For example, the construction of our welfare states 
might have been a tremendously important normative evolution. However, 
the set of ideals behind this particular rearrangement of the property system 
also generated its own exclusions and blind spots; it was based on a gendered 
division of labour, relegating women to the private sphere.44 We argue that GDJ 
proposals that intend to expand this welfare system into the global realm — 
for example, theories that argue for a universalisation of Rawls’ distributive 
principles — could entail the same dangers.
39   Obviously, there is no complete overlap between the three theories categorised under the ‘radical democracy’ label. 
For an interesting take on the commonalities and conflicts, see Jason Vick, ‘Participatory Versus Radical Democracy 
in the 21st Century: Carole Pateman, Jacques Rancière, and Sheldon Wolin’, New Political Science 37/2, 204-223. 
40   Anna Di Robilant, ‘Property and Deliberation: A New Type of Ownership’, in Saki Bailey, Gilda Farrell and Ugo Mattei 
(eds.), Protecting Future Generations through Commons (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2013), 73-74.
41   We use the concept of ‘post-traditional societies’ in a broad sense. It registers a shift in political and moral authority 
from transcendental sources (religion) to sources that are inherent to society. After the advent of political modernity, 
authority can no longer be justified on the basis of (religious) tradition but has to be justified through democratic 
debate, thus implying that it can always be contested. 
42  Mark Devenney, ‘Property, Propriety and Democracy’, Studies in Social Justice 5/2 (2011), p. 154.
43  Christopher Meckstroth, ‘The Struggle for Democracy: Paradox and History in Democratic Progress’, Constellations 
16/3 (2009), p. 414.
44  John Medearis (2015), p. 187.
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We can only conclude, following Chantal Mouffe, that the ‘domain of 
politics — even when fundamental issues like justice and basic principles are 
concerned — is not a neutral terrain where rational, universal solutions can 
be formulated in isolation from the pluralism of values.’45 Thus, conflict is so 
important in democratic societies precisely because it shows that we cannot take 
our normative order for granted and cannot count on a supposed consensus on 
the values that our society is built on; it also forces the political collective to deal 
with its blind spots.46 Applied to the subject of property arrangements, we can 
thus argue that monological property regimes are normatively deficient because 
they do not allow for this pluralism of values, do not value the rationality of 
political disagreement47 and do not incorporate democratic arrangements that 
allow for conflict and contestation. 
Non-Domination: A second problem with private and public property 
arrangements is that they can (and often do) lead to both market and non-
market forms of domination. The first form of domination can be linked to the 
property institutions themselves; the problem with systems of property, and 
certainly global systems of property, is that they are complex social institutions 
that tend to escape our democratic control. The reproduction of these social 
institutions is an unintended consequence of our actions that subsequently 
structures our future actions. The problem is, as John Medearis writes, that 
our common action can return to us ‘in the form of social forces, relations, or 
institutions that dominate’ some of us; and these structures of domination 
might allow certain individuals or groups to exploit and oppress others.48 This 
danger, we argue, is ever present in private and public institutions of property 
and no good reasons exist to think that this is not the case with global public 
institutions of property as well. 
However, these centralised global institutions recur in most GDJ theories that 
tackle the redistribution of benefits from the common earth.49 Caney’s proposal, 
for instance, considers that expanding the scope of democratic institutions to the 
global realm could counteract forms of domination in global institutions while 
Mathias Risse intends to solve these potential sources of ‘global domination’ 
by restricting the scope of global institutional structures as much as possible.50 
Yet, neither of the two seems able to abolish the possible sources of domination: 
45   Chantal Mouffe, ‘For an Agonistic Model of Democracy’ in Noel O’ Sullivan (ed.), Political Theory in Transition 
(London: Routledge, 2000), p. 120.
46   Andrew Schaap, David Owen, James D. Ingram and Hans Lindahl, ‘Critical Exchange: Hans Lindahl’s Fault Lines of 
Globalization’, Contemporary Political Theory (Published in Advance, 2015), p. 5. 
47  Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
48  John Medearis (2015), p. 105.
49   See Pogge’s Global Dividend (2011), Casal’s Global Fund (2011), or the Global Democratic institution of Simon Caney 
(2005), Ch. 5.
50  Risse (2012), Chs. 1, 16 and 17.
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while Caney’s proposal works as an expansion of the already deficient democratic 
system of states, Risse simply devolves the decision-making power over public 
policy to the state authorities, who (once again) end up having primary control 
over public goods provision.
A second form of domination is constitutive: a form of domination ‘in the norms 
and values that constitute the logics of […] social institutions.’51 Individuals are 
socialised into accepting certain norms and roles, and public institutions play a 
decisive role in this process; in principle, this is not problematic (no society can 
exist without a form of social reproduction), but it can lead individuals or groups 
to accept norms or roles that enable their own domination (or the domination 
of others). In other words, the social reproduction of norms can be organised 
in such a way that it serves the domination of one social group over another.52 
The welfare state example we gave previously is a good illustration of how this 
phenomenon plays out in the distribution of public goods. GDJ theories that take 
the Rawlsian original position approach risk making a similar mistake.53 The 
assumptions made by GDJ regarding how individuals will deliberate behind the 
veil of ignorance pre-define the scope of possible norms and political structures 
for society’s basic structure. This leads to the establishment of a social system 
that is incapable of seeing the constitutive forms of domination that are imposed 
on individuals or groups that do not match the human characteristics assumed 
under the original position.
Oppositional democratic activity plays a vital role in addressing and correcting 
these forms of domination in property arrangements. They could actually 
benefit from practices of contestation as these activities challenge (1) the ethical 
substance of property arrangements (are norms enforced from the top down?), 
(2) the normative quality of their ethical substance (do these norms violate the 
ideal of non-domination?) and (3) the modality of regulation (is regulation 
organised in a bureaucratic-statist manner?).54
Participation: A final critique of monological property regimes is that 
they discourage, sometimes even impede, democratic participation. In this 
section, we argue that the commons tragedy has transformed into a ‘tragedy of 
enclosures,’ as enclosures — both private and public — make it impossible for 
most people to make decisions regarding their own fate, be it in the social sub-
51   Michael J. Thompson, ‘The Two Faces of Domination in Republican Political Theory’, European Journal of Political 
Theory (Published Online in Advance, 2016), p. 7.
52  Michael J. Thompson (Published Online in Advance, 2016), pp. 7-13.
53  Beitz (1999); Pogge (2008), Risse (2012). 
54   Nancy Fraser, ‘Marketization, Social Protection, Emancipation: Towards a Neo-Polanyian Conception of Capitalist 
Crisis’ in Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derlugian (eds.), Business as Usual: The Roots of the Global Financial Meltdown 
(New York: NYU Press, 2011), 137-158, p. 149.
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sphere of the economy or with regard to ecological issues.55 
As Carole Pateman argued, what’s at stake in democratic participation is 
primarily the activity of participating itself: people (re)discover their political 
agency by participating in the democratic management of shared resources 
or practices of democratic decision making in the workplace. It is through 
participation in the different sub-spheres of society that people develop the 
adequate individual attitudes and psychological qualities that allow them to 
participate as democratic citizens in wider (political) society.56 Non-participatory 
views of politics (also evident in monological institutions of property), on the 
other hand, tend to create the passive citizens they expect to see. Moreover, 
participation in these local social domains also tends to make citizens more 
astute as they develop a critical awareness of the different public institutions 
and notice democratic deficits more easily.57
Another reason exists to encourage democratic participation, one that bears 
on the interplay between the different social domains and local and central 
institutions. Participatory forms of democracy break the monopoly of state power. 
The participatory budgeting experiment in Porto Alegre (Brazil), for instance, 
allowed poorer citizens to exert an influence on the state, thus resulting in their 
drastically increased access to water and sewage.58 Connecting this point to the 
previous section, we could argue that forms of local participatory democracy 
can help in preventing or contesting the different forms of domination that 
accompany the alienation (and accompanying forms of domination) of public 
institutions. 
Addressing the Democratic Deficit
In the previous section, we justified our questioning of monological property 
institutions’ democratic credentials. GDJ proposals cannot give a satisfactory 
answer to some of these critiques. This does not imply that none of these 
critiques are considered by the GDJ; some proposals, for instance, are attempts 
to counter forms of domination that stem from the accumulation of private 
property in the hands of few individuals. Furthermore, most GDJ theories 
would, at least partly, agree with our critique of the nation-state. That is, 
they actively question states’ current sovereign entitlements to control public 
goods within their territory. However, our concern is still valid. Although GDJ 
intends to take away the states’ exclusive privilege to control the goods and 
55   James Tully, ‘Two ways of realizing justice and democracy: linking Amartya Sen and Elinor Ostrom’, Critical Review 
of International Social and Political Philosophy 16/2 (2013), 220-232, p. 227.
56  Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 42.
57  Jeffrey D. Hilmer, ‘The State of Participatory Democratic Theory’, New Political Science 32/1 (2010), p. 59.
58  Jeffrey D. Hilmer (2010), p. 61.
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land within their territories,59 it actually reproduces the logic of monological 
control (over natural resources and land) at the global level. In essence, the 
problem is that GDJ proposals extend access to the earth’s common resources 
to a greater number of people; however, in the process, they exclude people 
from co-determining the use of this supposedly common property.
The issue with GDJ theories is that they are never as universal as they may 
seem to the theorist. One individual’s idea of justice might, once realised, become 
another’s form of domination. Here, we do not intend to suggest that we abandon 
all attempts to devise universal norms; we simply argue that every universalist 
theory should provide a more reflexive account of the genesis of these universal 
norms.60 Instead of attempting to theoretically arrive at universal norms that 
could inform the redistribution of the benefits of a particular property regime, 
we should, as James Ingram suggests, try to understand ‘how norms can become 
more universal, less arbitrary and exclusive, through successive challenges from 
the outside.’61 We claim that it is through democratic action that this process of 
universalisation occurs. This implies that both the ‘universal’ norms informing 
mechanisms of redistribution and the institutions of property that mediate 
this redistribution should be open to democratic contestation and popular 
participation, thus preventing the development of forms of domination in the 
resulting governance scheme. It is only through the democratic contestation of 
these norms and participation in their revision that cosmopolitan ideals become 
more universal.62 Regarding the debate on the earth’s common ownership, this 
implies that (a) we should be weary of governance schemes that are exclusively 
based on monological institutions of property with a democratic deficit and 
(b) we should focus more on ‘the commons movement,’ a group of concrete 
democratic practices that oppose and challenge the private–public property 
regime in the name of a similar ideal (namely, that the earth and its natural 
resources belong to everyone).
A Return to Commons?
Defining the Commons
The stage is now set to show why the commons are a vital form of opposition 
to monological forms of property. First, we have to outline what the commons 
59  Pogge (2001); Pogge (2008). 
60   See Carol C. Gould, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy and Universality as Norms for Transnational Democracy’, in Anthony 
Langlois and Karol Soltan (eds.), Global Democracy and its Difficulties (London: Routledge, 2009), 168-171.
61   James D. Ingram, Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2013), p. 205. 
62   GDJ are not necessarily antidemocratic. Authors such as Pogge (2008), Ch. 7, Thomas Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism 
and Sovereignty: “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples”’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 23/3 (1994), 195-224, and Darrell 
Moellendorf, Global Inequality Matters (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2009), Ch. 3, also defend the expansion of democratic 
principles to the global sphere. Nonetheless, our concern is still valid due to the lack of democratic involvement and 
contestation in the definition of the principles that ground their global political structures.
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are. One of the prevalent ways to look at them is through their flipside: the 
process of enclosure or primitive accumulation, as Marx called it. Primitive 
accumulation, Jason Read argues, ‘can be said to take place at every point 
where something in common is converted into private property […] or where 
the conditions for the production and reproduction of existence are converted 
into commodities.’63 Some contemporary examples of this process are the 
endeavours to end communal control over the means of subsistence, such as 
the attempts to privatise water supplies in Bolivia and the privatisation of life 
and knowledge commons through patents and copyrights.64 
The commons resist such attempts to privatise and commodify communal 
means of subsistence.65 Furthermore, not only do they resist private and public 
enclosures but they also refuse to be turned into any form of property. The 
common, Dardot and Laval argue, can only be instituted as unappropriable. 
That is, a common is something that can be potentially appropriated but that 
is made unappropriable through the institution of certain rules.66 Here, we 
diverge from Elinor Ostrom’s traditional economic definition of commons:67 
commons are no longer resources and spaces inherently unappropriable due to 
their natural characteristics (such as the atmosphere, the deep seabed, etc.) but 
are rather socially established as unappropriable.
This digression from traditional property paradigms is a result of a shift in 
focus from goods to the practice of commoning.68 A common is not a pool of 
resources that can be transferred at will, and no common can exist without a 
community. Communities sustain and produce commons; their social practices 
— the work of production and reproduction — constitute the commons, and 
their rules determine how resources are used and who has access to them.69 In 
this respect, we do follow Ostrom’s approach to governing commons: the human 
element should play a central role in discussions concerning the governing of 
the commons.70 To understand how a forest should be governed, we cannot 
simply focus on the location of the forest, the quantity of trees and its efficient 
63   Jason Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 2003), p. 27.
64   Midnight Notes Collective, ‘The New Enclosures’, Midnight Note 10 (1990), 1-9; Saskia Sassen, ‘A Savage Sorting of 
Winners and Losers: Contemporary Versions of Primitive Accumulation’, Globalizations 7/1-2 (2010), 23-50.
65   Massimo De Angelis and David Harvie, ‘The Commons’ in Martin Parker, George Cheney, Valerie Fournier, and Chris 
Land (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Alternative Organization (London: Routledge, 2014), 280-294, p. 281; 
Bollier (2014), Ch. 1.
66   Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, Commun: Essais Sur la Révolution au XXIe Siècle (Paris: La Découverte, 2014), 
pp. 233, 467-481.
67  Ostrom (1990).
68  Bollier (2014), p. 6, 8, 10.
69   Massimo De Angelis, ‘On the Commons: A Public Interview with Massimo De Angelis and Stavros Stavrides’ (2010), 
<http://www.e-flux.com/journal/on-the-commons-a-public-interview-with-massimo-de-angelis-and-stavros-
stavrides/> [Last Accessed on 01/12/2016].
70  Ostrom (1990), p. 88-102.
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distribution of benefits. We must also consider the human practices and social 
systems involved in the maintenance and reproduction of the earth’s resources 
and spaces.71
To be clear, commons do not entail prohibition of the use (or occupation) of 
specific resources; rather, they imply that neither these resources nor the land 
can be commodified or dis-embedded from the practices of co-production, the 
cooperative system of governance or the ecological relationships that surround 
them.72 Returning to our discussion of the GDJ, we concede that some kind of 
distribution, use and occupation of a resource or space is inevitable in case of 
scarce and rivalrous goods. However, if one does not focus on resource-specific 
appropriation of the common or on the distribution of its benefits and focuses 
on the whole social system that enables and structures these resources, and on 
the practices that sustain them, the idea of unappropriability is further clarified. 
Some flaws of GDJ theories regarding commons stem from an unwillingness 
to differentiate between appropriation of specific resources and enclosure of 
the land and the social systems that sustain them. Risse, for example, defines 
his proposal as a ‘common ownership’ regime but applies it exclusively to the 
resources that are to be considered as common (those required for satisfying basic 
human needs), although their actual production, distribution and occupation is 
not taken as a common; these rely on private market mechanisms (properly 
regulated) or the domestic provision of public goods.73 This is insufficiently 
common to be designated as common ownership. If the common is narrowed 
only to include the earth’s natural resources, without acknowledging the larger 
domain where these goods are produced and the mechanisms through which 
they are distributed, then it hardly fulfils its definition.74 
Risse argues against this expansive role of the social element in the co-
determination of the commons. He believes that allowing co-owners to have 
a say (and veto right) over every decision on the production, provision and 
distribution of the commons demands too much from a deliberation and could 
be potentially detrimental to the opportunity to satisfy one’s basic needs.75 
71   Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, ‘A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons’ in Charlotte Hess and 
Elinor Ostrom (eds.), Understanding Knowledge as a Commons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 41-82, p. 43. 
72  Tully (2013), pp. 228-229.
73   See Risse (2012), Ch. 6, esp. p. 111. For a critique, see Aresh Abizadeh, ‘A Critique of the “Common Ownership of the 
Earth” Thesis’, Les ateliers de l’étique/The Ethics Forum 8/2 (2013): 33-40, p. 35.
74   Abizadeh (2013) presents a similar critique, arguing that Risse’s account imposes moral constraints on other property 
regimes but that its focus on use dismisses an actual discussion about ownership. We sympathise with his critique 
of Risse’s ownership credentials (and would endorse it for various other GDJ proposals); however, our concern here 
is with Risse’s commons credentials. We consider that even if Risse’s theory were an alternative ownership regime, 
it would still not be a common ownership regime. Its individualist focus, its reliance on centralised mechanisms 
of production and provision and the absence of socioecological and democratic elements makes it insufficiently 
common. We thank an anonymous reviewer for comments on this point.
75  Risse (2012), pp. 120-122.
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First, Risse’s all-or-nothing idea of deliberation does not do justice to the 
various possible ways in which co-determination may be carried out; unanimity 
is not a requirement for almost any democratic scenario, and therefore there is 
no reason it should be assumed here.76 Second, even if a strict veto right were 
inherent to the co-determination of the commons, a veto on satisfying basic 
needs would be an unthinkable option. Co-determination ensures that everyone 
is bound by the same directives and, hence, no one would have the audacity to 
veto need satisfaction knowing that his/her own basic needs are at stake.
Second, this shift from considering commons exclusively as goods or 
resources to analysing them as social processes subsequently implies a shift 
from a sovereign disposition to the co-determination of use. The sovereign 
ownership of goods, the freedom to alienate or use them at will, would be 
replaced by processes of collective determination of the use of commons.77 As 
Carol Gould argues, if a practice is collective and defined by shared goals, then 
no single participant has more of right than the others to make decisions for this 
collective.78 Therefore, commons not only comprise a common practice but also 
(a) consciously created rules/laws to regulate both this common practice and 
the use of commons and (b) mechanisms that enable democratic participation 
and conflict so as to allow commoners to select rules/laws. Whereas monological 
institutions of property discourage popular participation, commons actually try 
to foster such democratic participation, and democratic credentials are inherent 
to the practices.
Practices of Commoning and the Politics of Democratic 
Universalisation 
The commons raise as many questions as they help solve; they foster democratic 
cooperation and provide an alternative to private/public property institutions. 
But how do these local practices relate to a debate that is both global and 
universal? First, an important qualification is that commons, in our view, are not 
a full-blown alternative to private and public institutions of property. However, 
this does not mean that they are merely a complement or an institutional 
alternative that performs the tasks that private and public institutions of 
property neglect to carry out. Precisely because they are an alternative that 
escapes some of the normative deficiencies of public and private property 
arrangements, they compete with these institutions as well. This already 
suggests which role commons might play on the global scene: not only do they 
allow commoners to reclaim their autonomy but by contesting private and 
76  Abizadeh (2013), pp. 37-38.
77  Dardot and Laval (2014), pp. 476-478.
78   Carol C. Gould, ‘Structuring Global Democracy: Political Communities, Universal Human Rights, and Transnational 
Representation’, Metaphilosophy 40/1 (2009), 24-41, p. 28.
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public institutions of property, commons also force these monological property 
institutions to confront their own limits. Even in a more ideally reorganised 
property system, the oppositional role of commons would still be imperative. 
Commons are thus local in practice but global in ambition; they are a glocal form 
of politics.79 By forming networks, they can confront the normative deficits in 
global public and private institutions of property and perform an essential role 
in the democratic politics of universalisation.
One possible concern still remains: the inevitability of exclusion and 
boundaries. The fear expressed in Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ is that 
commons risk depletion and spoliation if not enclosed.80 The standard response 
to this narrative is that natural commons are rarely ever open-access regimes, and 
commoners often devise collective arrangements to manage them.81 However, 
this implies that ‘some sort of enclosure is often the best way to preserve certain 
kinds of valued commons.’82 After all, no commons function without rules or 
laws that determine both use and duties of care and co-production. Laws, in 
turn, suppose boundaries that determine who ought to do what, where and 
when regarding this property.83 The boundaries of a legal order, however, exist 
by the grace of a political and legal collective that establishes what joint action 
should be about, thus implying certain forms of inclusion and exclusion.84 
If the functioning of commons depends on forms of exclusion and bordering, 
how does this differ from the case of enclosures that is central to private and 
public property institutions? Could GDJ not respond that commons are just a 
form of private property on a slightly larger scale (or a form of state property on a 
smaller scale)? Could it be that bordering processes clash with the universalising 
aspirations of the commons movement or their attempts to contest forms of 
exclusion?
The answer is that if enclosures are vital to the endurance of commons, only a 
democratic process of enclosure (as opposed to private or public enclosures) can 
be justified. This is because boundaries of democratically governed commons 
are open to constant renegotiation while public and private property regimes 
are not normatively required to do this.85 A tension between the universal 
values of equality and freedom central to democracies and the concrete, often 
79  James Tully (2014), pp. 73-82.
80  Hardin (1968).
81  Bollier (2014), p. 12; E. Ostrom and Hess (2007).
82   David Harvey, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (London: Verso Books, 2012), 68-70, 
p. 70.
83   Hans Lindhal, Fault Lines of Globalization: Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), p. 3. This concept of boundaries can be interpreted spatially — borders determine where processes of 
sharing stop — and metaphorically as legal orders structure action.
84  Lindhal (2013), p. 216.
85  Mezzadra and Neilson (2013), p. 279.
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limited, realisation of these ideals (borders and boundaries being two such 
limits) characterises them. What distinguishes democratic decisions from non-
democratic ones is that the former constantly question these (always partly 
arbitrary) institutions and boundaries. The democratic element at the core of the 
commons and their common activities are thus key to determining the duties to 
other commoners and distant others — they cannot abrogate these duties without 
betraying their democratic ideals. Carol C. Gould’s re-conception of the notion 
of transnational solidarity is a good example of how these different concerns — 
democratic action as being opposed to injustice, the existence of duties towards 
other communities and individuals, the importance of local autonomy — can be 
brought together without causing intolerable inconsistencies.86 Nonetheless, 
the consequence of accepting the claims of radical democratic theory is that no 
silver bullet exists that would once and for all allow us to reconcile the competing 
demands of autonomy/democracy and global solidarity/justice.87 
Conclusion
We confronted two literatures that share the assumption that the earth 
belongs to all in common but that take different roads when turning this idea 
into a political reality. GDJ theories take the road of (re)distribution; thus, to 
realise the idea of common ownership of the earth in a world that is currently 
unjust, we must impose limitations on potential appropriation of valuable 
resources and spaces and install mechanisms that (re)distribute the benefits 
taken from these resources in a way that accords with predefined principles 
of justice. The problem with the GDJ focus on principles of redistribution is 
that it dismisses other questions that are equally important when dealing with 
common ownership. For instance, how do social practices affect the way these 
common goods come into being? Moreover, who can legitimately decide how 
the distribution occurs?
A consequence of this selective focus is that public and private property 
institutions are taken as a given. In GDJ theories, the (re)distribution of common 
goods is inevitable due to the assumption that goods have to exist either as 
private or public property. We argue that this assumption not only discounts a 
third option but also disregards some of the normative problems inherent to it. 
These normative problems all return to the premise that an owner, private or 
public, is the sole agenda setter with regard to his/her property. The monological 
character of these property arrangements could result in different pathologies: 
forms of domination and exclusion or a passive citizenry. GDJ theories are 
86  Carol C. Gould, ‘Transnational Solidarities’, Journal of Social Philosophy 38/1 (2007), 148-164.
87   Rhyall Gordon, ‘Radical Openings: Hegemony and the Everyday Politics of Community’, Rethinking Marxism 28/1 
(2016), 73-90.
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prone to fall into these traps, despite their insightful critiques to private and 
public forms of appropriation, due to their reliance on the same monological 
institutions of property.
Finally, we argue that GDJ would benefit from taking notice of the existence 
of a democratic alternative to private and public property arrangements: the 
commons. To the extent that commons do allow for democratic participation 
and conflict and for the co-determination of the use of resources, they should 
be regarded as a legitimate alternative. It must be up to the citizens of this 
world to decide not only which principles are central to the (re)distribution of 
goods but also how and through which property arrangements this should be 
accomplished.88 
88   We would like to thank Martin Deleixhe, Helder de Schutter, Axel Marx, Maeve McKeown, Alasia Nuti and two 
anonymous reviewers for their thorough reviews on various versions of this paper. We also thank Samuel Cogolati, 
Linda Hamid, Alessandro Mulieri, Peri Roberts, Peter Sutch, Jean Vogel and Nils Verstappen for their comments. 
Previous drafts were presented at the HIW - Justice Seminar, MANCEPT Workshops 2015, Université Libre de 
Bruxelles, the International Conference on Global Commons (Leuven) and at the University of Geneva - MultiCite 
Seminar.
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